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Abstract 
So what’s social policy got to do with economic growth? Quite a lot, it would appear, if 
one takes the results of cross-country growth regressions at face value, as they are by many 
social policy analysts, even as they criticize the findings of the economic policy part of the 
very same regressions. I argue that these regressions are deeply problematic, and are 
antithetical to social policy analysts’ normal instincts on the importance of country and 
community specificity. At the same time, attempts to distinguish social policy from 
economic policy in terms of policy objectives is not very successful, while classifying 
policy instruments into economic or social also leaves a significant grey area. But the 
economic and social policy analysis literatures can indeed be distinguished in their 
approaches to understanding the mechanisms of policy transmission. Despite the 
difficulties of defining social policy analysis, except in contradistinction to economic 
policy analysis, both types of analysis are needed to advance understanding of policy 
impact and design of policy. The Bank should (i) play a lead role in developing and 
assessing such multidisciplinary approaches, (ii) move to a much more outcomes based 
system of aid allocation in recognition of the country-specific complexities of linkage 
between (economic or social) policy and outcomes, and (iii) understand itself better as an 
institution, and its institutional footprint in countries where it is a big player.
                                                 
1 T.H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and Management, and 
Professor of Economics, Cornell University. Keynote address at World Bank conference, “New Frontiers of 
Social Policy,” Arusha, Tanazania, December 12-15, 2005.  
1.  Introduction 
 
There are two ways in which one might approach the topic of this paper. One is to 
take a relatively straightforward interpretation through cross-country econometric growth 
regressions, and to discuss the range of factors that are adduced as explanatory variables in 
such analyses. In fact, a section of this paper will indeed be devoted to this literature. 
However, as you will see when we come to that discussion, I believe this would limit the 
scope of the topic considerably. So I am going to take another approach, a broader 
approach, which uses the title of the paper as a way into a deeper discussion of the 
relationship between the social and the economic in the theory and practice of 
development. 
 
 
2.  What’s Social Policy, Anyway? 
 
To answer the question in the title of this paper, we need to define the key terms—
economic growth and social policy. The first is relatively straightforward. Economic 
growth is the rate of increase of real per capita income. There may be some technical issues 
do with GDP versus GNP, or exchange rates versus purchasing power parity, but we all 
basically know what we mean when we use the term economic growth. What about 
economic development? There can be different degrees of broadening out from economic 
growth, adding changes in the structure of production to begin with. A recent 
undergraduate text (Lynn, 2003, p4) offers this definition: 
 
“Economic development means sustained and sustainable growth in per capita income, accompanied 
by diversification of production, reduction of absolute poverty, and expanding economic opportunities for all 
citizens.”  
 
In this view, environmental sustainability and poverty reduction are all part of the 
definition of economic development. 
 
 Let us consider, then, some definitions of social policy in the literature. The concept 
note for this conference (World Bank, 2005b) touches on a number of different aspects of 
social policy: 
 
 “A more holistic approach to social policy in development contexts, where markets are grossly 
imperfect and labor markets often incomplete, would seek to promote policies, institutions and programs that 
balance a concern for equity and justice with the concern for economic growth.…[S]ocial policy is defined as 
a series of public policies designed to promote social development… We envision social development as a 
natural complement to economic development with both intrinsic and instrumental value…While there is lack 
of consensus on the definition of social development it is generally understood to comprise of a set of 
objectives including social inclusion, sustainable livelihoods, gender equity, increased voice and 
participation.”  
 
The World Bank’s Social Development Strategy (World Bank, 2005a) defines social 
development as “transforming institutions to empower people,” and goes on to specify 
three operational principles—Inclusion, Cohesion and Accountability. The concept note for 
the conference (World Bank 2005b) tries a related triple when it says: 
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“As a working definition, social development can be described as the process of increasing 
-the assets and capabilities of individuals to improve their wellbeing, 
-the capacity of social groups to exercise agency, transform their relationships with other groups, and 
participate in the development processes, 
-the ability of society to reconcile the interests of its constituent elements, govern itself peacefully, and 
manage change. 
Social Policies then are public policies aimed at promoting equality of opportunity to benefit individuals, 
equality of agency to benefit groups, and both horizontal and vertical social integration.” 
 
 
In the glossary of the well known text by Hall and Midgley (2004, p xv), we find the 
following definitions: 
 
“Social development: A process of planned social change designed to improve the welfare of the population 
as a whole in conjunction with economic development. 
Social exclusion: The exclusion of certain groups from an acceptable standard of living or basic level of 
political participation. 
Social policy: Measures that affect people’s well-being, whether through the provision of welfare services or 
by means of policies that impact upon livelihoods more generally.” 
 
Finally, consider Mkandawire’s (2001) perspective: 
 
“Social policy should be conceived of as involving overall and prior concerns with social development, and 
as a key instrument that works in tandem with economic policy to ensure equitable and socially sustainable 
development…I define social policy as collective interventions directly affecting transformation in social 
welfare, social institutions and social relations.” 
 
The above quotations are, I believe, representative of the attempts to define social 
policy and social development. Two striking features stand out from these and other 
attempts in the literature. First, the definitions are almost always with reference to, or in 
relation to, or in opposition to, the “economic”. Thus we find that the hallmark of social 
policies is that they “balance a concern of equity and justice with the concern for economic 
growth”; that social development is “a natural complement”, or operates “in conjunction 
with” economic development; and that social policy “works in tandem with economic 
policy.”  
 
Second, the definitions range over objectives, instruments and mechanisms, without 
necessarily making clear distinctions among them. Thus, as noted above, in these 
definitions, social policy is that which brings considerations of equity and justice to the 
table, in contrast to a focus on economic growth alone; it uses instruments like spending on 
education and health, in contrast to instruments like the exchange rates or trade 
liberalization; and it emphasizes mechanisms that work at the group level rather than at the 
level of the individual. For each of these orientations—objectives, instruments, and 
mechanisms—the “social” is once again characterized, more often than not, in relation to 
the “economic.” In the following sections I will argue that the distinctions between the 
economic and the social based on objectives are not very persuasive, while those based on 
instruments are only slightly more so. The real distinction comes at the level of 
mechanisms, which in turn takes us to the different disciplines that straddle the economic 
and the social. 
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3.  Objectives and Instruments 
 
Which objectives of development are economic, which are social? Does it even 
make sense to ask this question? Surely the normative objectives of a society that emerge 
from deep reflection are neither wholly economic nor social. The objective, for example, of 
improving the lot of the worst off individual in society is just that. It emerges from a 
contractarian theory of justice under certain specifications (like the “original position” or 
the “veil of ignorance” of Rawls, 1971). It does not make sense to class this as an economic 
or a social objective. Sen (1985, 1999) also attempts to derive objectives for a society, and 
for that society’s development, from first principles. His view on enhancing capabilities, 
for example, is just that—it is neither economic nor social.  
 
Economic growth for its own sake cannot be a sensible final objective of society. At 
least, it seems difficult to derive it from fundamental normative principles. So if it 
nevertheless plays such an important part in discussion of policy and outcomes, it must be 
because of a strong belief that it is causally related to more sensible final objectives like 
enhancing capabilities or making the worst off person better off. In other words, at best it 
plays a role as an intermediate objective which may in turn lead to the achievement of the 
final objective if other things happen. But here we enter the realm of mechanisms, which 
will be taken up in the next two sections. 
 
Given that there has been a tendency in policy circles to focus on economic growth, 
it is understandable that some of those writing on social policy should view themselves as 
balancing “a concern for equity and social justice with the concern for economic growth.” 
But this stance itself gives economic growth the status of a final objective, which is a 
mistake. The focus, rather, should be on what is the final objective of policy and what is an 
intermediate objective, and on the mechanisms that link the intermediate outcomes to the 
final ones, and policy to both. 
 
As noted in the previous section, according to some definitions social development 
has a “set of objectives including social inclusion, sustainable livelihoods, gender equity, 
increased voice and participation” (World Bank, 2005b). But are all of these final 
objectives? What about social inclusion? Its opposite, social exclusion, is defined by Hall 
and Midgely (2004) as “the exclusion of certain groups from an acceptable standard of 
living or basic level of political participation.” Two issues arise. First, since voice and 
participation are already on the list of objectives, is one subsumed in the other, or is one an 
intermediate objective for the other? Second, is social exclusion part of the final objective 
because exclusion based on group membership is per se objectionable, or only 
instrumentally because it makes individuals in the group worse off, in which case it would 
be an intermediate objective? The issue of individuals versus groups will be revisited when 
we discuss mechanisms later in this paper. For now we note a lack of clarity in the 
literature on the final objectives of social development. 
 
As another example, take the definition in the Concept Note (World Bank, 2005b), 
that “Social Policies then are public policies aimed at promoting equality of opportunity to 
benefit individuals, equality of agency to benefit groups, and both horizontal and vertical 
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social integration.” This seems to define as an objective the benefit of individuals, and 
equality of opportunity as a way of achieving that—an intermediate objective. It also 
defines as an objective the benefit of groups and equality of agency as a way of achieving 
that—an intermediate objective. But horizontal and vertical integration seems to be left as a 
final objective by itself. Moreover, it is not clear whether the benefit of groups has a value 
in and of itself or only instrumentally because it benefits individuals. 
 
 Of course the definition of economic development given in the previous section is 
no better, since it lumps together economic growth, sustainability and poverty reduction all 
as objectives, with no indication of which, if any, are final objectives and which are 
intermediate ones. In general, there is a lack of clarity in both economic and social writings 
about the hierarchy of objectives, and a lack of distinction between intermediate and final 
objectives, or rather, too easy an identification of intermediate objectives with final ones on 
the basis of an implicit mechanism linking the two (economic growth and poverty 
reduction, social inclusion and individual well being, etc.). 
 
 What, then, are the final objectives? Since these depend on values and on 
alternative conceptions of the good life, there is no uniform or unique answer. What we can 
say, however, is that for each stated objective it should be specified whether it is valued for 
its own sake or because it is supposed to enhance some other objective through some 
mechanism (which should itself be clarified), or both. And a key issue is whether the final 
objectives are ultimately reduceable to the wellbeing of individuals, as opposed to the 
wellbeing of a group to which they belong, or whether there are some final objectives 
which stand independently of individual (or group) wellbeing. Gender equity is an 
example. Is it an objective in its own right, or is it an intermediate objective which leads, 
ultimately, to higher wellbeing of women and of men? Clarity on such issues can illuminate 
policy debates considerably. 
 
 So much for objectives. What about instruments? Does social policy have a 
distinctively different set of instruments from economic policy? Hall and Midgely’s (2004) 
definition of social policy as “Measures that affect people’s well-being, whether through 
the provision of welfare services or by means of policies that impact upon livelihoods more 
generally,” broadens the scope of instruments that come under the purview of social policy 
to any set of measures that “impact upon livelihoods more generally.” Exchange rates and 
tariffs surely do this, so are they instruments of social policy? One senses that those who 
identify themselves as social policy analysts would not go quite so far. Mkandawire (2001) 
takes the middle ground when he says:  
 
“…social policy may be embedded in economic policy, when the latter has intended welfare 
consequences or reflects implicit or explicit socioeconomic priorities, such as reducing politically 
unacceptable levels of unemployment. Nevertheless, some elements of social policy are more explicit, such as 
direct government provision of social welfare, in part through broad-based social services and subsidies.” 
 
The World Bank’s (2005a) Social Development Strategy identifies the operational 
principles of inclusion, cohesion and accountability, and it is unlikely that exchange rates 
and tariffs will contribute directly to these channels. However, instruments such as 
reforming corporate law, circumscribing customary restrictions on the property rights of  
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women, or introducing multi-party democracy, can be argued to be closely related to these 
channels, and seem in the literature to fall naturally into the social policy category. 
 
 Social policy instruments tend to be defined in the literature with reference to 
economic policy instruments. Social policy instruments are those which are not, and which 
go beyond, what are considered conventionally to be economic policy instruments. What 
are these? Monetary policy, fiscal deficit, exchange rate, tariffs and quotas, and capital 
account controls—all these seem to fall fairly clearly into the economic policy category. As 
we disaggregate the fiscal deficit, problems of categorization may arise. Are tax 
instruments part of economic policy or social policy or both? What about expenditure 
policies? The level and composition of public expenditures on health and education? These 
are claimed, it would seem, by both economic policy and social policy. Social safety net 
policy is certainly claimed by social policy, but anything with budgetary implications is 
also claimed by economic policy. Then there is labor market policy—minimum wages, 
employment guarantees, health and safety standards at the workplace. And credit market 
policy, ranging from financial repression, through the regulation of banks, to microcredit. 
Is the regulation of banks economic policy, but the regulation of microcredit social policy? 
Finally, there are a whole set of legal and institutional interventions such as those discussed 
earlier. There is no consensus on what exactly these are and what their effects are, but there 
would seem to be agreement that they are not economic policy and, as is clear from the 
Social Development Strategy paper (World Bank, 2005a), they are certainly claimed for the 
social policy domain. 
 
 The above shows that there is a continuum of policy instruments, from those that 
are conventionally and clearly recognized as being economic policy, through a spectrum to 
which both economic and social policy literatures lay claim, to a set of instruments that are 
conventionally and clearly recognized as social policy instruments. It should be clear that 
any or all of these instruments can affect any or all of the objectives discussed earlier in this 
section, whether they are final or intermediate objectives. While a division of instruments 
into “economic” and “social” may have some utility despite being a not very clear cut 
division, the claim that instruments in one set necessarily relate more closely to some 
objectives rather than others is a claim that cannot be made without a detailed investigation 
of the mechanisms involved. And yet we do find this in the social policy literature. There is 
a certain tendency to associate social policy instruments, in contrast to economic policy 
instruments, with certain objectives such as equity or justice, in contrast to the presumed 
objective of economic policy (economic growth, for example). Such simplistic association 
may be necessary in the early stages of the development of a social policy constituency, the 
self definition in relation or in opposition to economic policy being a useful device at these 
early stages, but it ultimately leads to weak analysis and weak policy conclusions. 
 
 Thus a distinction between the economic and the social is not, in my view, very 
usefully made in the realm of objectives and instruments. However, this still leaves the area 
of mechanisms. 
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4.  Growth Regressions 
 
How can we know the impact of policy instruments on objectives? The central and 
dominant method for answering this question, certainly in agencies like the World Bank, 
has been the method of searching for statistical regularities in instruments and objectives 
across countries. The usual objective considered is an intermediate one—economic growth. 
Each country’s historical experience generates observations on the rate of growth, and on a 
range of either policy variables or variables that can be interpreted to be closely related to 
policy variables, as well as structural variables that a country cannot change (like its 
geography). Cross-country econometric regression analysis is then used to test various 
hypotheses about the causal links between policy instruments and economic growth. 
Although economic growth is most often used as the variable to be causally explained, the 
method can of course be used for any objective of interest (for example, changes in infant 
mortality rates). 
 
Growth regressions are used and abused in the debate on economic and social 
policy. For example, they are the leading piece of evidence in the claim that trade 
liberalization is good for growth. This is then fed into another regression—that of changes 
in poverty on economic growth, to argue that since trade liberalization is good for growth, 
and growth is good for poverty reduction, trade liberalization is good for poverty reduction. 
These very same types of regressions, but this time with explanatory variables from the 
“social policy” set, are used to argue for the importance of social policy not only for 
“social” objectives but also for “economic” ones (like economic growth). This certainly 
applies to variables that measure institutional quality, or ethno-linguistic fragmentation, or 
“trust”, or gender equity, or land inequality, and so on. For example, the Social 
Development Strategy paper (World Bank, 2005a, p3), argues as follows: 
 
“By transforming institutions to empower people, social development matters for growth and who 
benefits from it…Research shows that some social development indicators, particularly cohesion indicators, 
correlate positively with foreign direct investment. Conversely, from a cross-section of 98 countries, Robert 
Barro found that lower initial conditions of cohesion hampered growth…Finally, based on cross-country data 
of social development indicators, more accountable institutions in a given year correlate with higher growth 
in the following decade.” 
 
The literature on cross-country growth regressions is huge and cannot possibly be 
surveyed here (for a more detailed development of my views on this literature, see Kanbur, 
2005a). The cross-country regressions literature is useful in many ways, as a pattern 
description exercise or a method for suggesting initial hypotheses. And I have myself used 
the method on many occasions. But there are at least three types of problems with it: (i) 
data and econometrics; (ii) variations around the average regression; and (iii) interpretation 
of the results in terms of mechanisms. 
 
Data shortcomings are endemic in the explanatory variables used in growth 
regressions. The problems apply equally well to “economic” as to “social” variables. For 
example, one way to measure trade openness is the level of tariffs. But tariffs are not 
necessarily implemented—indeed, the corruption of customs officials is a stock anecdote 
used to bolster up perception based measures of institutional quality (like Transparency 
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International’s corruption rankings). So what is the real level of tariffs if the rates on paper 
are not the ones that apply in reality? One answer is to take tariff revenue as a measure. The 
problem here is that this measure is an amalgam of a policy instrument (tariffs) and the 
response to this policy instrument (imports). This introduces statistical problems in 
disentangling the true effects of the policy on growth. But data on the social side is not 
problem free either. For example, much of the corruption data that is used in cross-country 
regressions is based on the perceptions of a relatively small number of domestic and 
foreign observers in business. As such, it may only reflect phenomena in the large scale 
formal sector. 
 
Even if the data were problem free, there remain basic problems in interpreting 
statistically significant regression coefficients as indicators of policy efficacy. Rodrik 
(2005) provides a litany of econometric problems with such regressions (parameter 
heterogeneity, outliers, omitted variables, model uncertainty, measurement error, 
endogeneity, etc.). He then highlights the central conceptual problem—for the regression to 
have causal cutting power, the basic assumption must be that variations in the policy are 
independent of variations in other variables in the regression, in other words, policy 
variation is exogenous. But if governments are choosing policy (whether the instrument is 
“economic”, or “social”, or in between) to advance certain objectives, variations in the 
policy variables cannot be exogenous. To quote Rodrik (2005, p4): 
 
“Consider an illustration from trade policy. The estimated coefficient on import tariffs in growth 
regressions run for the contemporary period is typically negative (albeit insignificantly so) and rarely 
positive. One frequently hears the argument that we can at least draw the conclusion from this fact that import 
protection cannot be beneficial to growth. But once again this and similar inferences are invalid. A negative 
partial correlation between growth and import tariffs is not only consistent with protection being growth-
enhancing, it is actually an equilibrium consequence of trade protection being used in a socially optimal 
fashion.” 
 
It is important to emphasize that while the example is given from trade policy it applies to 
any policy, “economic” or “social.” This is a generic critique of cross-country regression 
analysis, and gives no comfort to those who highlight to the importance of social policy by 
pointing to significant coefficients on social variables in cross-country regressions. 
 
All of the above is about the statistical relationship between policy and growth on 
average. But there is considerable variation around the estimated average in all cross-
country regressions. What are we to make of the fact that some countries are well above the 
estimated relationship (in other words, they are doing much better with the policy than 
would be predicted from the average), or are well below it (doing much worse than 
predicted). The usual econometric answer is that these variations are caused by purely 
random factors and so have no information content whatsoever. But this is most 
implausible. What is quite likely is that variations around the estimates of average 
relationships are not simply pure random variations, but reflect country specific factors that 
are not captured in our model and in our data (Kanbur, 2005b). As a recent World Bank 
report on economic growth in the 1990s argues (World Bank, 2004, pp vi-vii):  
 
“The Study concludes that valid general principles do not imply generic “best practice” policy or 
institutional solutions…. 
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Regarding trade, the analysis highlights the fact that countries that have successfully integrated into 
the world economy have followed different approaches and also adopted a range of complementary policies, 
making it difficult to pin down the exact relationship between trade integration and growth…. 
Perhaps the lesson of the lessons of the 1990s is that we need to get away from formulae and realize 
that economic policies and institutional reforms need to address whatever is the binding constraint on growth, 
at the right time, in the right manner, in the right sequence, instead of addressing any constraint at any 
time….” 
 
This leads then to the final problem, which is in fact highlighted by the first two 
problems. A statistical correlation between growth (or some other outcome) and a policy 
variable, even if it is not subject to the econometric critiques laid out above, tells us nothing 
about the underlying mechanisms through which the policy variable affects the 
(intermediate or final) objective. Ultimately it is confidence in these mechanisms that 
should guide our confidence in the impact of policy instruments. And building that 
confidence is not (just) about running cross-country regressions, or even some other 
technique. It is about using different methods of analysis, and different types of micro and 
macro level evidence, to aim for a coherent position on how and why a particular policy 
instrument, whether economic or social, or combinations of policy instruments, will have a 
particular effect on an objective of interest, in a given context. But such a perspective 
inevitably leads us to a discussion of different modes of analysis and different disciplinary 
approaches. 
 
 
5. Mechanisms and Disciplines 
 
An earlier section of this paper has already alluded to the fact that social policy 
analysts tend to define social policy in relation to, often in opposition to, “economic 
policy.” And it cannot of course escape notice that those who analyze “economic policy” 
are by and large are those whose training is in the discipline of economics, while those who 
analyze “social policy” are by and large those whose disciplinary training is not in 
economics. While the discipline of economics is unified (pretty much) by a single 
paradigm and method, “non-economics” is not. For a start, it is several disciplines—
anthropology, political science and sociology being the most prominent. And, within each 
of these disciplines one does not find the paradigmatic unity that there is in economics. At 
least in the context of development policy studies, what seems to unite these disciplines, 
and their sub-branches, is viewing themselves as an alternative paradigm to the economic 
method, each in its own different way. 
 
The tensions between economics and other disciplines, in academia and in 
development agencies, are palpable, and we have to confront them in any discussion of 
social and economic policy. As I have observed elsewhere (Kanbur 2002, p1): 
 
“Development economics stands in beleaguered ascendancy, atop development studies and 
development policy. Economists and economic thinking dominate the leading development institutions. The 
prestige of development economists within academia, now that they have demonstrated themselves to be 
squarely in the mainstream of economics, has never been higher. And yet, something is clearly not right. 
Particularly in the policy domain, development economics is under scrutiny like never before—its 
prescriptions attacked, its analysis of development phenomena questioned. Often this criticism comes 
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from other social science disciplines and social scientists, who feel shut out from the commanding heights of 
development analysis and policy making, and who feel looked down upon by economists, as being “soft” and 
“unrigorous”. But increasingly, the criticism is coming from economists themselves, who are finding their 
tools and techniques, strong as they are, to be inadequate by themselves to address pressing policy and 
analytical problems.” 
 
 I argued earlier in the paper that characterization of economic policy in terms of 
pursuing a particular objective (economic growth), and social policy as pursuing a different 
objective (equity and justice) was not a very powerful or a useful classification device. 
Certainly if economic policy is what economists do, many of them would object to a 
definition of their role as not including the pursuit of equity (Kanbur, 2004b). Also, while 
the division of policy instruments into “economic” and “social” fares a little better in terms 
of conventional classification, there is a continuum, and many instruments can be claimed 
by either. Rather, I believe the real differences can be identified if we focus on the 
mechanisms through which a policy instrument is thought to have an effect on objectives. 
This is turn leads us to a discussion of different frameworks of analysis and different 
theoretical presumptions that underly different disciplines. 
 
 General characterizations are fraught with difficulties, but I believe they can be 
attempted for economics—at least, the critics of economic method seem to have no 
difficulties in offering such generalizations. One characterization is of course that the 
economic method focuses on mechanisms that work through the operation of markets. 
Thus, a classic piece of economic analysis goes as follows. Opening out an economy 
increases demand for the product which that economy produces most cheaply. This will be 
the product which uses the cheapest factors of production most intensively. And the 
cheapest factors of production will be those which are the most abundant. Since unskilled 
labor is abundant in a developing country, opening out that economy will increase total 
demand for products that use unskilled labor most intensively, and will therefore increase 
the demand for unskilled labor. This increase in labor demand will reduce unemployment 
and raise wages among unskilled workers. What I have just described, the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, is at the heart of arguments made by many economists that trade 
liberalization will be good for poverty, and it has to be said that this is the dominant instinct 
of the vast majority of economists. The role of markets in the above chain of mechanisms is 
very clear—product markets and labor markets interact to produce the above result. The 
problem, however, is not that the mechanism operates through markets. It would be 
difficult to imagine an economy engaged in international trade in which the chain of 
consequences following on a trade liberalization did not go through markets. Rather, the 
problem is to do with assumptions about the nature of these markets, in particular, that they 
are “competitive”, with no individual or group of individuals exercising market power 
because of various structural features (Kanbur 2001, 2002, 2004a). Again, the problem is 
not that economic analysis that is taught in graduate schools does not broach issues of 
monopoly or oligopoly—it is that in economic policy analysis the canonical model seems 
to dominate. 
 
 Not all economic analysis of mechanisms operates solely through markets. For 
example, the vast economic literature on intra-household inequality is about interaction 
between individuals within a household, with no prices or markets in the conventional 
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sense. But what this literature has in common with the general literature on individual 
interactions through markets is the specification of individual behavior as optimizing a 
specified and stable objective function. This is often criticized, and rightly so, when the 
individual level objective functions are too narrowly specified, for example as having only 
monetary and consumption determinants or not having concern for others. It is important to 
realize, however, that there is nothing inherent in the method that precludes a broadening of 
individual objectives, even including, for example, the characteristics of a group that the 
individual identifies with. Indeed, much work on the frontiers of economic theory is 
precisely of this type (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, Dasgupta and Kanbur, 2005, 
Kanbur, 2003a, and Banerjee et al., 2005). But it is yet to become embedded in basic 
graduate courses in economics. However, even the most advanced work, which views 
individuals in the context of groups, shares with the rest of economics a thoroughgoing 
methodological individualism—the behavior of groups cannot be discussed except as an 
aggregation of the (possibly complicated) behavior of individuals who form that group. 
 
 Another characterization of economic analysis of policy is that the analysis is 
supremely unconcerned about the processes, particularly the political processes that 
generate policy. This is related to the Rodrik (2005) critique of the tendency to view the 
explanatory policy variables in growth regressions as exogenous to the process, when they 
are in fact manipulable by policy makers and therefore endogenous. But these policies are 
the outcome of group and political interactions that take place according to rules whose 
origins lies in previous historical interactions, for example the legacy of colonialism. Once 
again, the frontiers of economic theory are alive to these possibilities (for recent examples, 
see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005), but economic 
policy analysis is not, at least not to the same extent. 
 
 In my view, then, the core characterization of the economic method, as it is used in 
policy analysis, is three fold: (i) a focus on understanding outcomes through the behavior of 
and interaction between individuals qua individuals; (ii) a focus on market mechanisms, 
particularly competitive market mechanisms; and (iii) a tendency to treat policy variables 
as exogenous and manipulable independently of individual and group interactions. All of 
these features are being questioned at the theoretical frontiers of the discipline, but they 
define the centre of gravity of economic policy analysis. 
 
 One characterization that can be offered of other methods or disciplines in 
development studies is simply as the opposite of the three features mentioned above: (i) a 
focus on understanding outcomes through the behavior of interaction of groups qua groups; 
(ii) a focus on non-market mechanisms; and (iii) explicit attention to the processes that 
determine policy. One might identify the first primarily with sociology, the second with 
anthropology and the third with political science. Such a simplistic characterization will 
and should be resisted. But such resistance does raise the question—what comparable core 
features quintessentially characterize the anthropological, the sociological or the political 
science method? Part of the difficulty in answering this question is of course the lack of 
paradigmatic unity within each of these disciplines. But I believe that we do need to have 
such a characterization if we are to use different methods and techniques of analysis to help 
us understand the impact of policy instruments on objectives. 
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6.  What’s It Mean for The World Bank? 
 
I have argued that the real difference between “economic policy” and “social 
policy” literatures and approaches lies not in objectives, and not entirely in instruments, but 
rather in the mechanisms and methods that the two approaches bring to the understanding 
of phenomena and to the understanding of causality from policy instruments to objectives. I 
have argued that the economic method, despite its considerable strengths, has significant 
shortcomings, and other approaches and methods are needed to provide an overall approach 
to policy analysis. However, it is not entirely clear how exactly different approaches are to 
be combined (for an example of general juxtapositions of economics and sociology see 
Grusky and Kanbur, 2004; for economics and anthropology see and Kanbur and Riles, 
2004; for combining qualitative and quantitative approaches to poverty analysis, see 
Kanbur, 2003a, Kanbur and Shaffer, 2005). 
 
With this background, and given the Bank’s interest in social policy, the question 
arises—what should the World Bank do? The World Bank’s Social Development Strategy 
Paper (World Bank 2005a, pp v-vi) gives an answer to this question that is worth quoting at 
some length. 
 
“To enhance impact and improve efficiency, the Bank proposes a new business model for how it will 
promote social development in its operations…. 
Under Strategic Priority 1 the Bank will increase support for countries to bring social development 
processes, analysis and content into their overall poverty reduction or development strategies. This shift 
implies building government capacity for more effective and representative stakeholder participation while 
countries prepare and implement their country strategies…Finally, requiring no additional Bank-imposed 
conditionality, development policy lending will support government efforts to improve inclusion, cohesion 
and accountability using countries’ own systems. For example, it will support policies that promote greater 
budget transparency or enable communities to manage public funds. 
Under Strategic Priority 2 the Bank will enhance the impact and reduce the cost of how it 
approaches social development processes, analysis and contents in each of its projects…Given the Bank’s 
emphasis on more and better agriculture and infrastructure lending, it will increase support for community 
involvement, participation and understanding of social context in such projects. 
Under Strategic Priority 3 the Bank will strengthen the grounding for its social development work 
by enhancing research, capacity building and partnerships. Bank-supported research will build upon existing 
context-specific analysis to improve understanding of the complex relationship between social development 
and economic growth…The Bank will also strengthen evaluations of the social development impacts of its 
economic activities…” 
 
Given that the Social Development Strategy Paper (World Bank 2005a) defines social 
development as “transforming institutions to empower people,” in other words a fairly 
instrument-oriented definition, it is not surprising that the above tends to think of social 
policy instruments as being distinct and in a separate domain from economic policy 
instruments. It is also not surprising given that this is the strategy developed by the Social 
Development Department, and institutional divisions are more naturally done along 
instrumental lines. 
 
I have several observations on the above strategy, which makes a lot of sense in the 
institutional context in which it is developed. First, in my view it tends to fall into the trap 
of separating off economic policy analysis, and the economic method, from social policy 
analysis and the approaches of other disciplines, despite the difficulties in defining 
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precisely what these alternatives are. In my view no single approach, drawing on any single 
method, can give an entirely convincing explanation of outcomes, and thereby underpin a 
satisfactory policy analysis. The key is to combine these different approaches, and yet we 
do not have sufficient experience of doing so, and sufficient assessment of attempts at 
doing so. The Bank and its projects are fertile ground for purposive deployment of 
multidisciplinary teams. This already happens, of course. But it would be very useful to 
have an assessment of the issues raised by attempts to bring different perspectives on a 
single project. Such assessments, and then a meta-assessment, would provide guidance for 
design of future social policy work, indeed future policy work. Such an exercise could 
easily fall under Strategic Priority 3. 
 
A related idea to bring together the power of different approaches, the “economic” 
and the “social”, is to start with a specific problem and task a multidisciplinary team to 
address it. This also happens, of course—I am suggesting a more systematic and purposive 
use of the device. For example, take the millennium development goal of achieving 
significant reductions in infant mortality rates. With that as the final objective, what policy 
package would be recommended by a team of economic and social policy analysts in, say, 
a group of three or five countries, each with very different circumstances? In keeping with 
the previous paragraph, one would at the same time assess how well this exercise worked 
and what could be done to improve it. 
 
An altogether more radical idea follows from the critique of cross-country 
regression analysis, which I have argued is misused as much by the social policy camp as 
by the economic policy camp. This framework, which searches for an average relationship 
common to all countries, underlies the link between the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) of the Bank and the IDA allocation formula. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Kanbur, 2005b) the logic of this relationship is that when the CPIA score is 
high “aid performance” will be high. The formula is the same for every country, only the 
scores vary on different dimensions of the CPIA, which encompasses standard economic 
policy variables as well as a slew of institutional and social variables. The assumption is 
that when these standardized variables are better, aid will do more good. I argue in Kanbur 
(2005b) that even if we accept this as an average statement (which is subject to all the 
critiques discussed in an earlier section); it is deeply problematic to apply the average 
relationship to every country. Economists may (wrongly) slip into such habits of thought, 
but social policy analysts have no excuse, since one of their critiques of the economic 
method is its neglect of country specific institutional and social factors. If it is unacceptable 
to say that a lower level of tariffs will necessarily lead to a higher growth in a particular 
country, then surely it is equally unacceptable to say that a lower level of “corruption” (as 
measured for example in the CPIA guidelines) will necessarily lead to an improvement in 
infant mortality rates. 
 
Once again, what is important is the detail of the specific mechanisms, which will 
vary from country to country. This is why pulling the same policy lever (whether economic 
or social) can and does have very different effects in different countries, and why taking the 
experience of one country (or the average experience of all countries) as “best practice” to 
be applied to each country is deeply problematic. The radical idea, then, is to use the rate of 
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change of a final objective (for example, infant mortality rate, or income poverty, or girls 
enrollment) itself as a measure of performance, it being recognized that we cannot set down 
general rules for the linkage of policy instruments to those outcomes, at least not rules that 
are the same for all countries. This line of argument, which is developed and defended in 
its conceptual and operational dimensions in Kanbur (2005b), leads to an output based 
allocation of aid, as opposed to an input based allocation of aid which is what the CPIA 
based method actually is, albeit that it takes into account instruments conventionally 
thought of as economic, social, and in between. My specific operational proposal is to 
introduce one such outcome based category in the CPIA to begin with, and to then assess 
the experience in three years’ time (Kanbur, 2005b). 
 
The final and most radical idea, or rather a radical set of questions, flows from a 
glaring dissonance in the Social Development Strategy Paper (World Bank, 2005a). It is 
striking, for an approach that emphasizes institutions and power, that there is no direct 
engagement with the Bank itself as an institution, and an important institution, a “big 
player”, in many countries, especially in Africa. And this despite a huge literature, some by 
the very social policy analysts whose work is used and quoted approvingly in other 
contexts, on the Bank and its institutional footprint. There are many layers to be peeled off 
here. At its most parochial, the Bank is an organization with a particular culture. What is 
this culture? What are its functionalities and dysfunctonalities if the objective is to help in 
the removal of poverty? Then in the countries, the Bank, and this applies equally well to 
big donors in each country, is not a passive player. Its every move and utterance is 
carefully watched and scrutinized. Particularly where it is a big player financially, even if it 
doesn’t want to it becomes part of the domestic political discourse. Is this good, bad, or 
indifferent? Would the Bank be more effective if it were a smaller player? Relatedly, 
culturally Bank staff in developing countries are clearly part of the well heeled expatriate 
set. They exude wealth and privilege and power. And yet in one sense the power that they 
have is limited. As I have argued elsewhere (Kanbur, 2000): 
 
“How can the strong be weak? It is of course true that representatives of the aid agencies in Africa, 
those who “parachute in” for missions of a few days and those who are resident locally, are the 
symbols of the power of the donor agencies. They stay in the big hotels (or big houses), are driven 
around, and demand to see policy makers at the drop of a hat. As they travel in convoys of four 
wheel drives to inspect projects funded by their agencies, and as they mingle on the diplomatic 
cocktail circuit, the resentment they evoke in the local population should not be underestimated. But, 
when it comes to it, these symbols of strength hide fundamental weaknesses that arise from the inner 
logic and dynamic of the aid process and donor agency imperatives.” 
 
The “inner logic and dynamic of the aid process and donor agency imperatives” then takes 
us back to the beginning, to the Bank as an institution. 
 
 This is not the occasion for specifics on Bank reform. And I am not suggesting that 
the Bank spend vast amounts of resources analyzing itself as opposed to analyzing 
developing country institutions. I merely want to say to those who emphasize the 
institutional aspects of development: “institutionalist, understand thyself!” 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
So what’s social policy got to do with economic growth? Quite a lot, it would 
appear, if one takes the results of cross-country growth regressions at face value, as they 
are by many social policy analysts, even as they criticize the findings of the economic 
policy part of the very same regressions. I have argued that these regressions are deeply 
problematic, and are antithetical to social policy analysts’ normal instincts on the 
importance of country and community specificity. At the same time, attempts to distinguish 
social policy from economic policy in terms of policy objectives is not very successful, 
while classifying policy instruments into economic or social also leaves a significant grey 
area. But the economic and social policy analysis literatures can indeed be distinguished in 
their approaches to understanding the mechanisms of policy transmission. Despite the 
difficulties of defining social analysis, except in contradistinction to economic analysis, 
both types of analysis are needed to advance understanding of policy impact and design of 
policy. The Bank should (i) play a lead role in developing and assessing such 
multidisciplinary approaches, (ii) move to a much more outcomes based system of aid 
allocation in recognition of the country-specific complexities of linkage between 
(economic or social) policy and outcomes, and (iii) understand itself better as an institution, 
and its institutional footprint in countries where it is a big player.
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